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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
vs. 
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE 
LOT OF PROPERTY, 
Defendant. 
FRANK PARKER, 
Claimant/Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Claimant Frank Parker filed this appeal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § §78-
2a-3(2)(k) (1953 as amended), in that the Utah Supreme Court, on January 23, 1996, assigned 
this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a civil judgment of forfeiture entered against the defendant 
currency and property, and against Claimant Frank Parker, by Judge Sandra Peuler in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does the forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency violate the United States 
Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines or cruel and unusual 
punishments? 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 960059-CA 
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Does the forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency violate the United States 
Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, without deference to a trial court's ruling. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The trial court's determination of questions of 
fact will not be set aside unless found to be clearly erroneous. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 24, 1995, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture. Claimant Frank Parker filed 
his answer on May 17, 1995. A trial in the forfeiture case was held on September 13, 1995. The 
trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its Judgment of Forfeiture on 
October 17, 1995. Claimant filed his notice of appeal on October 5, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 21, 1994, Claimant Frank Parker (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant") 
was arrested, while on parole from the Utah State Prison, after he responded to a page from John 
Blanchard wherein Mr. Blanchard informed Claimant that he (Blanchard) wished to purchase 
cocaine from Claimant. (F. 2, R. 39) Claimant was arrested at a 7-11 convenience store located 
at 4811 South State Street, where he had arrived in the Defendant vehicle, to consumate a 
cocaine sale to Mr. Blanchard. (F. 3, R. 39). 
After securing Claimant and his vehicle, a search of the Defendant vehicle was 
conducted, incident to Claimant's arrest, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of Claimant's 
parole release from the Utah State Prison. At the time of Claimant's arrest, only he and his 
passenger had been in the Defendant vehicle. (F. 4, R. 39) In the Defendant vehicle, a black 
pouch was found, which contained several small baggies, each of which contained a white, 
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powdery substance. (F. 5, R. 39) This type of packaging is consistent with the sale and 
distribution of cocaine. (F. 5, R. 39). 
Claimant's passenger, Kimberlee Croft testified that the black pouch and baggies were 
the sole property and possessions of Claimant. (F. 6, R. 40) At the time of Claimant's arrest, he 
was transporting, in his vehicle, several baggies which contained a white, powdery substance. 
The substance was tested by the Utah State Crime Lab, and found to be cocaine, with a total 
weight of 10.7 grams. (F. 7, R. 40). 
At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was using and had used the Defendant vehicle, pager 
and cellular telephone to facilitate the transportation and distribution of controlled substances, to 
wit: cocaine. (F. 8, R. 40) At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was in the possession of the 
defendant currency, which was located in the proximity of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, 
and which is therefore presumed to be the illegal proceeds of the distribution , purchase or sale of 
controlled substances. (F. 9, R. 40). 
Defendant currency was found in proximity to controlled substances, namely cocaine. 
Claimant produced no evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the 
defendant currency is the proceeds of, or was intended to be used to facilitate, violations of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act. (F. 10, R. 40) Claimant produced no testimony or witnesses to 
contradict the State's witness evidence and testimony. (F. 11, R. 40) Defendant currency is the 
proceeds of the illegal trafficking or distribution of controlled substances. (F. 12, R. 40) Frank 
Parker is and was at all times the only registered owner and title holder in and to said Defendant 
vehicle. (F. 14, R. 40). 
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On April 24, 1995, a Complaint of Forfeiture1 was filed by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office, seeking forfeiture of the Defendant property and currency seized from 
Claimant on November 21, 1994. Notice of Seizure, Intent to Forfeit and a copy of the 
complaint were served upon Claimant on April 28, 1995 (See Return of Service, R. 10). On May 
17, 1995, Claimant filed an Answer to the Forfeiture Complaint. 
On January 12, 1995, Claimant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced offense of 
Possession of a Controled Substance3. The trial in the forfeiture case was held on September 13, 
1995. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment of Forfeiture4 were thereafter 
entered by the Court on October 17, 1995. (R. 38-43, 46-49) 
CONSTTTUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Consitution: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 of Appellee's Addendum. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 of Appellee's Addendum. 
See Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) attached as Addendum G of Appellant's Brief. 
Attached as Exhibits 3 and 4, respectively, of Appellee's Addendum. 
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Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (Supp. 1995): 
The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists 
in them: . . . 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind 
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, 
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of 
this chapter. 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used 
or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property 
described in Subsections (l)(a) and ( l )(b) , . . . 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this act, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used 
to facilitate any violation of this act; 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
Claimant failed to raise both his Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines, challenge to the 
subject forfeiture proceedings, and his Fifth Amendment, Double Jeopardy challenge to the 
subject forfeiture proceedings in any way sufficient to allow either the State to respond thereto at 
the trial court, or to allow the trial court to commence any analysis of these issues. Claimant 
offered no evidence or testimony regarding the issues he now raises on appeal, and only briefly 
alluded to the issues in his arguments to the trial court and the close of the forfeiture trial. 
Claimant failed to preserve the issues he now briefs on appeal, and should be precluded from 
asserting these issues in this forum. 
The forfeiture of the defendant property is not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 
There is undisputed evidence that the forfeited property is the instrumentality and proceeds of 
illegal drug trafficking. A clear nexus exists between the property and the criminal conduct of 
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Claimant. Further, the forfeiture here at issue is certainly not so disproportionate as to be 
determined excessive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court, last month, ruled that civil in rem forfeitures 
are not punishments for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal Constitution. 
Consequently, there is no Fifth Amendment prohibition against the instant forfeiture. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUES HE NOW RAISES ON APPEAL 
Appellate courts do not generally consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). This general rule applies to all issues, 
including constitutional issues. Id- The purpose of requiring issues to be raised and preserved in 
the trial court is to "put the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 
(Utah App. 1989). This Court has long advised that "the trial court is considered the proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues". Brown, supra, at 360, 
quoting State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)(requiring defendants to introduce 
their request for state constitutional interpretation before the trial court). Failing to do so denies 
the trial court "the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the 
claimed error". Brown, supra, at 360, quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter.. 823 P.2d 479, 
483 n.6 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Specificity 
In order to properly raise an issue in the trial court and preserve it for appeal, a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be 
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made in the trial court. State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Such an objection and 
preservation must be specific and timely, Brown, supra at 360, and must be a part of the trial 
court record. State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 1994). 
The specificity requirement arises as an inherent component of the trial court's need to 
assess the specific legal doctrine placed at issue in the context of the facts as they are borne out 
through trial. See Brown, supra at 361. Merely mentioning an issue without introducing 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal. Brown. 
supra at 361; LeBaron, supra at 483 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Appellant failed to raise perceived constitutional issues in his Answer. He 
further failed to raise or argue such issues in his pre-trial "Motion to Return Seized Evidence". 
At trial, he failed to present any evidence or case in chief whatsoever, and, according to his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance he merely "recollects addressing the issue 
of 'Double Jeopardy,' and 'Excessive Fining Imposement". The record reveals no submissions 
of relevant legal authority seeking the trial court's interpretation of the double jeopardy or 
excessive fines clauses of the Constitution, and in fact, there were none. 
Following trial, at which Appellant failed to introduce any evidence or testimony, 
Appellant, in his closing argument, with no prior motions, memoranda or citations, mentioned 
the issues of double jeopardy and excessive fines. Appellant failed to appropriately seek the trial 
court's interpretation of the issues he now raises on appeal. Appellant failed to preserve his 
claimed constitutional prohibitions in the trial court, and he should not now be able to raise them 
in this forum. At no time were Appellant's constitutional claims raised in the trial court 
sufficiently to be considered and addressed by the trial court and thereby preserved for this 
Court. 
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B. Timing 
Because Appellant's pre-trial and trial litigation lacked substantive specificity to 
adequately preserve the issues he now raises in his appeal, it is appropriate for this Court to 
consider whether any later actions by Appellant sufficiently and timely raised or preserved his 
appellate claims. See Brown, supra at 361. Timeliness is considered a prerequisite to appellate 
review because entertaining belatedly raised issues "sanctions the practice of withholding 
positions that should properly be presented to the trial court but which may be withheld for the 
purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal." Brown, supra at 361-62, quoting State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 
48, 53 (Utah 1981); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 78 (Utah App. 1990). 
Appellant has failed to undertake any post-trial motions, and has made no effort to 
belatedly, or in any manner, allow the trial court to address his constitutional claims. In fact, 
Appellant failed to even wait until the trial court had entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and its Judgment of Forfeiture, before filing his Notice of Appeal. This was 
in spite of the fact that the Davis case which he cites as authority for his position in his 
Docketing Statement was decided on September 21, 1995, a full two weeks before he filed his 
Notice of Appeal. There were no post-trial efforts to raise Appellant's claimed errors in the trial 
court. This paucity of preservation waives, and should conclusively preclude this Court's 
consideration of Appellant's unpreserved issues, and therefore of his appeal in whole. See 
Brown, supra, at 363. 
C. Appellant May Not Excuse Failure To Preserve Appellate Issues 
By Relying On The Plain Error Exception. 
In State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that issues 
raised for the first time on appeal would be addressed only if the trial court proceedings 
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demonstrated plain error. The Court held that the plain error exception to the preservation 
requirement has two prerequisites, each of which must be met for appellate review of issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. First, the purported error must have been obvious to the trial 
court. Second, the error must have been harmful in that it affects the substantial rights of a party. 
See Id., at 853. 
Appellant's double jeopardy and excessive fines arguments would not have been obvious 
to the trial court, absent an appropriate raising and preservation of the issues. At the time of trial, 
no Utah appellate court had interpreted the double jeopardy clause in the context of property 
forfeitures arising pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et seg. And in fact, at this time, this 
Court's decision in State v. Davis. 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1995) cert granted — P.2d — (SC 
96-0005)(03-26-96), remains the only appellate decision regarding the double jeopardy 
implications of property forfeitures incident to the enforcement of Utah's controlled substances 
laws. Davis arose in the context of a forfeiture in connection with possession of a controlled 
substance and deals only with conveyance forfeitures arising under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13(l)(e). Id. at 949 n.13. Furthermore, because Appellant failed to adequately raise an excessive 
fines claim, the State put on no evidence, and the Court made no findings, as to the value of the 
items forfeited or the cost of prosecuting Appellant. It is clear that Appellant's issues on appeal 
were not, and could not have been, obvious to the trial court. 
In comparison, the Supreme Court, in State v. Eldredge, faced a similar situation where 
an appellant failed to raise an issure in the trial court, and raised it for the first time on appeal, 
citing as support for reversal, a decision which was rendered after the trial. See State v. Eldredge. 
773 P.2d 29 (Utah) cert denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). Eldredge 
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arose from a child abuse prosecution, and dealt with whether or not the trial court's failure to 
enter written findings under section 76-5-411 was plain error. Id. at 34-36. The Eldredge court 
concluded that no plain error had occurred, and in so doing, its "primary reason was the fact that 
the trial court had not yet had the benefit of the supreme court's opinion in State v. Nelson, 725 
P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986)". State v. Cook. 881 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah App. 1994). 
Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant claims that the trial court's forfeiture of the in 
rem defendant property is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court in Davis. However, the Davis decision was issued 
eight days after trial in this matter. The trial court did not have the benefit of Davis at the time of 
trial, nor could the State alert the court of Davis's impact on the case then at bar. Following this 
court's decision in Davis, Appellant failed to properly raise any claimed Davis issues with the 
trial court in post trial relief motions. 
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that drug 
related forfeitures do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See United States 
v. Tilley. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994). Where there is a difference of Constitutional 
interpretation between two federal circuits (at the time of trial, the Ninth Circuit had held that 
forfeitures are punishment for double jeopardy purposes, United States v. $ 405.089.23 U.S. 
Currency. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion amended on denial of rehearing 56 F.3d 41 (9th 
Cir. 1995), rev'd— S.Ct.—, slip. op. (U.S. June 24, 1996), the State submits that the trial court 
commited no plain error in forfeiting the seized property, absent, and especially in light of, 
Appellant's failure to preserve his issues on appeal. 
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The State does not address the substantial right prong of the plain error exception, in that 
although the State would agree that property ownership and double jeopardy are substantial 
rights, the substantial right infringement is conjunctive with the finding of an obvious error, and 
the failure of the alleged error to be obvious to the trial court prevents this Court from reaching 
consideration of whether or not Appellant suffered the infringment of a substantial right. 
D, Appellant May Not Excuse Failure To Preserve Appellate Issues 
By Relying On The Exceptional Circumstances Exception. 
Although it is not well defined, an additional exception to the preservation requirement 
has arisen, in the context of exceptional circumstances. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 
(Utah 1993). The exception is ill-defined, and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies. Id. 
The instant case does not present a rare procedural anomaly for several reasons. First, 
Appellant is basing his appeal on federal double jeopardy jurisprudence, as well as the Davis 
decision. Although Davis was rendered after trial in this matter, Appellant failed to use post-trial 
relief motions to seek the trial court's determination Davis'' effect on the facts and evidence of 
this case. This cannot be the first, nor will it likely be the last time that an appellate decision has 
possible bearing on a recently tried case. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate such 
circumstances, and consequently allow post-trial relief motions. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, and 60. 
The timing of the Davis decision does not create a rare procedural anomaly in this case. Cf. State 
v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)(where the court found exceptional circumstances 
because if the court did not decide the issue, there could conceivably be two separate judgments 
and two appeals from the same case). 
Second, although Appellant relies on federal double jeopardy jurisprudence in this 
appeal, citing $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, which was decided by the 9th Circuit in 1994, in 
support of his assignment of error, he supplied no such case law for the court's pre-trial or post-
trial review. Appellant clearly could have submitted this case to the trial court in order to raise 
and preserve the issue, and did not. The fact that this Court relied on $405.089.23 U.S. Currency 
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in its Davis decision merely supports the State's contention that case law existed which would 
have supported Appellant's position if he had desired to seek the trial court's review of his 
current constitutional claims. 
Third, at the time of trial, as has been previously pointed out, Utah case law was silent as 
to whether or not forfeitures are punishment for purposes of Constitutional double jeopardy 
protections. There are a myriad of other issues which have yet to be decided by Utah appellate 
courts. This Court should not condone or sanction Appellant's failure to preserve his issues 
merely because Utah case law was silent at the time of trial. Such an exception would make a 
mockery of the preservation requirement, and would certainly not be indicative of an exception 
for rare procedural anomalies. Appellant's failure to appropriately and adequately preserve his 
appellate issues prevented the trial court from undertaking a "thoughtful and probing analysis of 
the issues". State v. Bobo. supra, at 1273, which is the very reason Utah courts refuse to address 
issues on appeal which were not raised in the trial court. See Brown, supra, 856 P.2d at 359-60. 
POINT II 
THE FORFEITURE OF THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Claimant asserts that the forfeiture here at issue violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution^ The United States Supreme Court, in 
Austin v. United States. 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993), ruled that a federal forfeiture statute6 is subject 
to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines. This application of the Eighth 
Amendment was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. A House and 1.37 Acres. 886 
P.2d 534 (Utah 1994), wherein the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fine's 
5
 . Claimant has neither raised nor briefed any issues relating to the Utah Constitution. Consequently the State will 
not address such State Constitutional claims. 
6
. 21U.S.C.A. §881(a)(4,7) 
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Clause applies to I Jtah Code Ann. §58-37-1 3( 1 i of the I Jtah Controlled Substances Act, which 
proceeds of drug crimes, involved in illegal drug activities. 
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to limit the government's power to pui 
Austin : "^ S* " ' ' . • • : . . . - ' • * 
punishment purpose, then UK ijrhvui-jiMv ^i the highth Amendment is no\ Uiggux* - nu 
Court, in A House and / 3" Acres, supra, held that, as applied to real estate and conveyances. 
1 ^ c i , . * . _..,h 
Amendment protections iii upph mg UIL Fighdi Amendment's protections against excessive 
lines, the Utah Court held thai the relevant uiqmr\ to detennun uhethe? *•• ->»>t a for!eitujv K 
an analysis oi the proportionally bet\w ^ hn leituiv and the c nniinui actn ities. A House and 
1.37 Acres, supra at M : 
1 \ee^3 >)M - - . 
and the use to which it is put, and secondarily by the proportionality between the criminal 
offense and the property forfeited. 
A. Nexus and Instrumentality 
"Any excessive fines analysis should begin with a basic "substantial connection" or 
t 
\ >, I V U M en ivi i . • . v c n . \ 
Under an instrumentality analysis, "the focus is on the relationship between the property 
and the offense, i.e., was it close enough to render the property, under traditional standards, 
'guilty'and henceforth forfeitable?" A House and , - \ vu • • •• - ;„nitcj States 
v. One Parcel of Property Located at 427 & 42c> Hall Street. • inerv. Montgomery County. 
Ala.. . n# JVUSU... supra at 181.'» (Si aha, J. „ 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). The initial burden is on the state to 
establish a "substantial connection" between the defendant property and the offense. A House 
and 1.37 Acres, supra at 541. 
In this case, the trial court found, based upon evidence, that the defendant pager was used 
to summon claimant to a controlled substance exchange, that the pager and cellular telephone 
were used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, that the 
seized currency was located in the proximity of controlled substances, and that the seized 
currency was the proceeds of illegal drug distribution. 
Further, the trial court found that the forfeited vehicle was used to transport and conceal 
10.7 grams of cocaine which was packaged for distribution, (F, 7,8; R.40), and was used to 
facilitate the illegal distribution of cocaine. (F8, R.40). 
The clear evidence provides ample nexus between the forfeited property and the 
distribution of cocaine. Clearly the forfeited property was, each and all, the instrumentalities 
used by Claimant to illegally distribute, attempt to distribute or agree and arrange to distribute 
cocaine. Defendant has failed to marshall any evidence against the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
and, in fact, failed to present any evidence at all to the trial court. (F.l 1, R.40). 
B. Proportionality 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court in A House and 1.37 Acresr, nor the United States 
Supreme Court in Austin set forth a detailed test as to when a forfeiture is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment because of excessiveness. It is apparent, however, that something more than 
merely the status of the property as an instrumentality of crime is to be considered. 
14 
iiicv..;i v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle. *• !> " ' ' ." ^ j: »i > 198 7), th< = ! Jl i ih 
Court of Appeals had an opportunity to consider whether u cw ?i forfeiture was "unduly harsh." 
Tin CIIIIII lii'lul lli.il illlin,1 loilcilmiii n\\ i mlniiuli' \aliial all UJ I(HM) compared to the $60.00 
street value of amphetamine tablets was not considered "unduly harsh." Id. at 395. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted that "as for the small amount of drugs involved, 
H U M ii i h li;ii<« i i i i l i u i i i l 1 l i rh l lli.tl l ' l ' • l • ' ' " ' ' ' " ' i l l 11 n 
quantity of contraband found," State v. One :..u : \ ; <X. ! 41-42 (Utah 1986). 
Other jill isdicti- 3ns hi.. - q,, .._« ~ :i:xiai .SLU..;^ w:\c\i determining whether 
a forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense committed. See United. States \ Culler. 979 F.2d 
092 (4th Cr 1 no2) (forfeiture of a $300,000.00 building used to distribute controlled substances 
t ' l i iumi i***i..-. •• * •* . »| Hi- n\\ lii'liiiiiij'lY ilispii piiihoi ili lii lii*. 'ipftiiisi ); 
United States v. One 1 * ,che. 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) ("forfeiting a $35,000.00 
automobile which is used to transport 6.23 grains of cocaine and 2.78 grams of concentrated 
cannabis is not 'grossly disproportionate to the offense committed.1"; United States v. 
Cunningham. 757 F.Supp. 840 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (forfeiture of $432,850.00 for purchasing thirty 
(U l i kilnj.inini' nl (*K nut » "i1 i "" iii M hi«lmiii|.p| \ tlisjin i|»ai in iiijiir \w 11 HI1 damage lie has 
caused;1'); United States v. U. S. Fishii im, 725 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D.Fla. 1989) 
(forfeiture ol defendant":) liieboat valued at 30: was not disproportionate to $1,942.40 of 
illegally obtained seafood.). 
In this case, the forfeited property consists of a 1986 Honda vehicle, a pager, a cellular 
telephone JIKI "i Ih 7 (ill ml dmc pronvrt,'; z'1 f tn.iil inn i v idnin" \uii' iiiiiitiin i ju tu l a lo lli ilii If 
the vehicle, or the value of the drugs seized, as Claimant foiled to raise an Eighth Amendment 
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argument in any of his pleadings, and did not present any evidence of his own. When Claimant 
first raised the Eighth Amendment issue, in his closing argument at trial, the trial court allowed 
the State to discuss relative values, with the approximate value of the seized drugs being 
$ 2,000.00. (Tr. 6, R. 81). The relative values herein involved clearly fall within the non-
excessive parameters set by this Court, and other jurisdictions, in previous cases. Claimant 
presented no evidence as to the value of the vehicle forfeited, and in fact, rose no Eighth 
Amendment argument unti lit was too late for the State to re-open the trial and introduce such 
evidence. 
POINT III 
THE FORFEITURE OF THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A, In Rem Forfeiture Is a Remedial Sanction Which Does Not 
Implicate The Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Claimant contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibits the State from seeking the forfeiture of the Defendant 
property following his collateral criminal conviction. 
The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause provides: "nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb" U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
The core area protected by this clause has always been a defendant's right not to be tried for a 
criminal charge more than once. United States v. Wilson. 420 U.S. 332, 343, (1975); See Schiro 
v. Farley. 114 S.Ct. 783, 789 (1994) (holding that the prohibition against multiple trials is the 
controlling constitutional principle). See also Tibbs v. Florida 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United 
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States v. Dixon. I i \ "' '" 'I }M l(> '}KK » I I WVi |S,»,iU i ' in TI I,I. II, ll„ ,IM^IIH nl in ,,;i,l un.l 
dissenting in part). State v. Miller. 747 !\2d 440 (I Jtali App. ! ->- . ) . 
Ci i' II forfeiture statutes, however, have never been viewed as having a pervasive, penal 
effect. The Supreme Court has often rejected the claim that statutes providing for the in rem ci < il 
forfeiture of property constitute punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes, Indeed, because laws 
of customs and imposts laws M piracy - were anions' the earliest statutes enacted by Congress 
See United States v. K)i liuena \ ista Av> 1^ 11 ^ 11 ^2 (\ 993) (plurality opinion 
of Stevens, J.), they ^ r itediy have been upheld amr-M '( <v\ mv CSSHIILIIII * 
criminal and subject to the prodedural rules governing criminal prosecutions." Helvering v. 
Mitchell. 303 1 J S 3C 1 I I : [U 38] 
In Various Items of Personal Property v. United States. 282 U.S. 577 (1931), the Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the contention that the prior conviction of property owners for 
defrauding the government of liqi lor taxes bai red the forfeiti ire of propei t) ( 
warehouse, and a denaturing plant) used in the commission of the fraud. Id. at 580. The court: 
reason ig against the property, rattier than "a 
criminal prosecution *. i^  the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, 
convicted aiiu paii^h^ ki. .n ;>N * J he court accordingly concluded that "[t]he forfeiture is no 
part of the punishment for the criminal offense," and th<: it "[t]he j: t o v ision of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply." Ibid.: See also 
Dobbins's Distillen v United States. 96 1 J.S 395, < 103 10 1 (18 ; 8).7 
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In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam), the 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a forfeiture of 
property smuggled into the United States after the acquittal of the person charged with illegally 
importing the property. The Court held that "the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it invovles neither two criminal trials nor two criminal 
punishments." Id. at 235. The court found that the civil sanction of forfeiture was properly 
characterized as remedial because "[i]t prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the 
United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages 
for violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for 
investigation and enforcement expenses." Id at 236-237; See also Van Oster v. Kansas. 272 
U.S. 465, 466 (1926) (property used to violate the law may be regarded as a "common 
nuisance"). 
The Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed its long standing view of in rem forfeitures 
in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. 354 (1984), where the Court held 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a civil in rem action to forfeit firearms "involved in 
or used or intended to be used in" violations of the Gun Control Act of 1968 following the 
owner's acquittal of related violations of that Act. Id. at 362-366. The court explained that, 
"[u]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially 
criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable." Id. at 362. In concluding 
Various Items was decided on the same day as United States v. La Franca 282 U.S. 568 (1931), where the court, 
to avoid a constitutional issue, unanimously construed a statute that authorized a civil action to recover certain taxes, 
which the court viewed as penalties, as not permitting such recovery after conviction of the defendant for a criminal 
offense arising from the same transactions. Justice Sutherland, who wrote for the Court in both cases, after alluding 
to La Franca, noted that such considerations did not apply to "a proceeding in rem to forfeit property used in 
committing an offense." Various Items, supra at 580. 
18 
Ill ml lllii iff ft *h p i ' o a v d i n ^ lUMiilil mill t i l l i b IM' " i r v c d .T- II Si i u l m l i i Mlii Idl [ >l uSCI i i l h h t i , l l iC C O U l t 
noted that Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil remedy, Id at 363, that the forfeiture 
provisions were meant to ... oroader in scope than the criminal sanctions," L4 at 364, since they 
provided for forfeiture of proeprty "involved in or used or ini * f 
law, Id. at 363, and that the statute furthered the "broad remedial aims" of "discouraging 
used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce," Id. at 364/ Because the 
forfeiture served goals "plainly more remedy uian punitive" Ibid., and because the clair'int 
failed to clearly establish that the statute was "so p=m i t i \ t • i * i •' ! 
Congress' intent "to establish a civil remedial mechanism" Id. at 365, the court concluded that 
the ' i\ criminal act, but r*ihf*r Q 
separate civil sanction, remedial in nature[,] . . . [that was] not barred by the Double Jeop 
Clause, Id. ui ,>o(#. 
The cases relied on bv (liiimanl misumsliin,' u iliiin If (I IN1 Niiriiniiic ( 'in mil s, ilk IT; inn is 
since 89 Firearms, contorting them into a hybrid of Eighth Amendment/ Fifth Amendment 
JUM' piii'lfu * " 1111 li I'l'iiniK (i in i mi, luiittlied j cars ol Supreme ( .... ^neiture precedents, by 
failing to recognize that United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 4 J 3 , IU9 S.CI. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 48 7 
(. * •*": ; n\ okcd an established doctrine of double jeopardy law — the prohibition of multiple 
punishments— which by then had developed subitrI (< > i111pu11;1111 In11i h 11 n iI• • S p< v i I i r; 11 h th.it 
branch of double jeopardy law only comes into operation when a criminal defendant has been 
Compare Utah Code. Ann. § 58-37-13(1) et seg., which likewise extends forfeitures to properties and items 
derived from, used, or intended to be used, to facilitate a violation, oft IK- \ -lah •' '-;-:MiL'd Substances Act. 
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placed "in jeopardy, i.e. at risk of conviction for a criminal offense. The protection against 
multiple punishments is a consequence of jeopardy, not a substitute for it. 
B. In Rem Forfeitures Do Not Implicate The Double Jeopardy 
Clauses' Prohibition Against Multiple Punishments 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the "multiple punishments" doctrine as reflecting two 
distinct principles of double jeopardy law. The first principle is that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibits a court, when it sentences a defendant in a criminal case, from imposing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 717-718 
(1969). The second principle is that the Clause also protects "against additions to a sentence in a 
subsequent proceeding that upset a defendant's legitimate expectation of finality." Jones v. 
Thomas. 491 U.S. 376, 385 (1989). An improper increase to a sentence would occur, for 
example, "where a judge imposes only a 15-year sentence under a statute that permitted 15 years 
to life, has second thoughts after the defendant serves the sentence, and calls him back to impose 
another 10 years." Ibid.. See Id. at 392-394. (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. 
DiFrancesco. 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer. 474 U.S. 28, 30-31 
(1985) (per curiam). 
Halper was an extension of the rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, once 
it has become final and unappealable, may not be modified so as to increase the sentence already 
imposed. Halper was criminally prosecuted and convicted in 1985 of violating the federal false-
claims statute,9 by submitting 65 inflated Medicare claims that each charged $12 for what was 
really a $3 procedure. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined $5,000. Halper. 
supra at 437 & n.2. 
The government later sought civil sanctions based on the same inflated claims under a 
"fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provision" of the type that "in the ordinary case . . . can be 
said to do no more than make the Government whole." Id. at 438, 449. That statute required for 
each violation a penalty of $2,000, an additional amount equal to two times the government's 
9
 18 U.S.C. §287(1982) 
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damages, and the costs of the civil action jd. at 438. Because of his numerous violations, 
however, "Halner . . . appearei ' ' I. 
In upholding inc UibU.v i u)iin ,s iciu.^ ai u< aiter judgment m that amount, me supreme 
Court noted, "the Double Jeopard) Clause's proscription of multiple punishment 
mtrnv*. . ^ i 
and the purposes thai the pen,: i\ ma) linm he sjid to serve," Id. at 448. 1 he Court concluded 
that "the labels 'criminal and 'civil' are not of paramount importance" in that inquiry, since "in 
dHHit i i t i i i i^ whether ,' (> i l h i u'.n rivl\ SIMK'IMMI \ 'M'SIIIM'I *. a I'nm'ni'l pimi'.limen • '"i 
purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding 
giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated." M. ai 44 7 &, u.,. I he court accordingly 
h[e]ld that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who 
alreadv has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be 
subjc .o an additional civil sanction to the extent that the 
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial but 
only as a deterrent or retribution. 
M, ai 4>fl"i 44 i1 (cmpliaM1. aildnl), ih t ont A House and 1.37 Acres, supra. ^ iU<iperc™%T* 
emphasized it was defining "a rule for the rare case," when a defendant ib bur v? -" 
so "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused" that "it constitutes a second 
punishment. i. 
Austin leaves unaltered the conclusion that an initial "jeopardy" is a prerequisite to the 
ii - /loieuion.-*. lustin, which was not a double jeopardy case, held 
that the civil forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4), (7) there at issue -rigioci 
applicability of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The Austin court expressly 
distingui ! . • • . . ... >r 
goods involved in customs violations, after noting that the forfeitures in both of those cases were 
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remedial. Austin, supra at 2811 -2812 {citing 89 Firearms, supra and One Lot Emerald Cut 
Stones, supra.). The Austin court relied on Halper in assessing whether in rem civil forfeitures 
could be viewed as a "punishment" that triggers the protections of the Eighth Amendment. 
Austin, supra at 2805-2806, 2810 n.12, 2812. But Austin did not purport to alter Halper's double 
jeopardy holding as a rule for "the rare case" in which "a prolific but small-gauge offender [was 
subjected] to a [civil] sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused," 
after having been criminally prosecuted and punished. Halper. supra at 449. 
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch. 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994), the third in a 
recent trio of cases on which the Ninth Circuit relied, and upon which Claimant relies in 
asserting that in rem forfeitures implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause, does not support 
Claimant's interpretation of Halper and Austin. Kurth Ranch mentioned Austin only in passing 
to describe Austin's Eighth Amendment holding, Kurth Ranch, supra at 1945, and actually held 
that Halper did not furnish the proper framework for analyzing the issue before the court, which 
was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred collection of Montana's drug stamp tax on the 
possession of dangerous drugs after the "taxpayers" had been criminally prosecuted and 
punished. Kurth Ranch supra at 1948. The court struck down the tax's imposition after a 
criminal conviction, based on several "unusual features" in the statute that authorized it, which 
"[t]aken as a whole" rendered the tax "a concoction of anomalies." Id. at 1947, 1948. 
Specifically, the court found it significant that the tax statute conditioned liability on commission 
of a crime, that the tax was due and collectable "only after the taxpayer ha[d] been arrested for 
the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place," that the tax was an in 
personam sanction that was exacted after the drugs had been confiscated and destroyed, and that 
22 
Iln« U\\ mi n in mi ml i "ill In iniHur III in rii'lil linn". line iiii.irbl \ \\\\\v ml llir ilniy . lull -ml II"11 I ' ('i lln 
court noted, "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer never 
la w liillll;) possessed as an unmi .L^J.'!^ \ active character" especially when it is "imposed on 
criminals and no others." Id. at 1948. 
Those exceptional features persuaded the court that the proceeding to collect the tax "was 
1 , u n 
jeopardy a second time lo? \h same offense'" for which they had previously been criminally 
prosecute ....„.*• conclusion that the Halper test was inapplicable suggests that 
the court viewed the proceeding to collect the tax as Y ^ c r ^ '• • hci\cnn^.. w*; ••. 
at 400, and thus that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on successive criniin il 
prosecutions 
Claimant relies upon Davis, to support his proposition that Utah double jeopardy 
jurisprudence regards all in rem forfeitures as punishment. In Davis, the Court of Appeals h 
that the forfeiture of a vehicle, pi u si lant 
the illegal possession ol 1/4 gram of cocaine \ahu * * ipproximalely $25, constituted 
p .i -;.i •« le jeopardy clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of 
Appeals relied upon its analysis of the reasoning set out in Austin and adopted in A House and 
LJ ,icres, basing its analysis on the Ninth Circuit's decision in $405,023.89 U. S, Currency, 
supra. 
Based on that analysis, ihe Davis court ruled thai the appropriate test is to determine 
s\ . . ,..ess the sanction can be viewed as 
solely remedial, the court ruled, it should be considered punishment, Da\ K ^ ' 
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which is the exact opposite application of the remedial standard set forth in Various Items, and its 
progeny. 
Last month, it its most recent and most definitive Double Jeopardy/Forfeiture ruling, the 
United States Supreme Court stated clearly and concisely, that "These civil forfeitures (and civil 
forfeitures generally),... do not constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. United States v. Ursery. — S.Ct. -—, slip op. at 1, (U.S. 06-24-96) [consolidated appeals 
and decisions of United States v. Ursery. on certiorari to the Sixth Circuit, and United States v. 
$405.023.89. on certioarai to the Ninth Circuit.] 
Speaking first of the analysis used by the Ninth Circuit, and relied upon in Davis, the 
Court stated: 
We think that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. None of those decisions 
purported to overrule the well-established teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones 
and 89 Firearms. 
IdL, at 14. 
Emphasizing that Halper involved a civil penalty, and not a civil forfeiture, the Court 
again stated that the rule enunciated in Halper is limited to civil penalty cases, and not civil 
forfeitures. Id 
Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are designed to do more than simply 
compensate the Government. Forfeitures serve a variety of purposes, but are designed 
primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to require disgorgement 
of the fruits of illegal conduct.... Quite simply, the case-by-case balancing test set forth 
in Halper, in which a court must compare the harm suffered by the Government against 
the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplicable to civil forfeiture. 
LLAtl6. 
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disclaimed reliance upon Halper, finding that its case-specific approach was impossible to apply 
Dutside the context of a fixed ci \ il p enalt> pro\ ision. ,Icl 
The Court further ruled, and clarified, that the Austin holding was limited to the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, declining to expand Austin \s analysis into 
doi lble jeopard} ji irispi i idence M at 19. 
In sum. the Court ruled, "nolhini: in Hainc Kurth Ranch, or Austin, purported to replace 
< .jr....a.;j;;^ .:iucvi\., ^ii.-.i . , . w».-es not constitute punishment for the purpose 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id Consequently, the Double Jeopardy bar against multiple 
punishments is inapplicable. 
1 
Circuit's decision in $405,023 Hl) compel the rcsersal and dismissal of the instant civil in rem 
forfeiture action. T;K ;.„p^;,.. Court has reversed the Ninth Circuit, and made clear that the 
Ninth Circuit's analysis of Austin, Halper and Kurth Ranch v\ -• \ • v i is
 ; "
!
 s s i i m * ; ; - - -
rose and preserved the Double Jeopardy issue for appeal, which the State vigorously disputes, the 
S'uprenu "' oii«' • » ill ' i ' n "n Ill ii" ' ' / ' i ' " «*(Mii(ids I!H I "in h'sion \\x\xil\ms, as it interprets 
federal constitutional claims, is no longer viable, and that civil in rem forfeitures are neither 
punishment nor criminal, prosecutions for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Ursery , 
slip op, supra at 24-25. The State's judgment of forfeiture auain^ n •' nt .*,- n 
his trafficking of cocaine does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the I Jiiited States 
arguments, the State will not address any State Constitutional issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's judgment of forfeiture violates neither the Fifth, nor the Eighth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The forfeiture judgment and order of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 1996. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
CRMS 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
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were delivered to Frank Parker, Claimant Pro Se, at 1388 Richard Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115 on the 26th day of July, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
COMPLAINT OF FORFEITURE 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT (#5344) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
BY: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-2 615 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, 
ONE LOT OF PROPERTY MORE 
FULLY DESCRIBED IN THE 
ATTACHED EXHIBIT A, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and for cause of action alleges: 
1. That the defendant is 94-13659 Murray City Police 
Department Case Number, One Lot of Property More Fully Described in 
the Attached Exhibit A. 
2. That Frank Parker is the individual in whose possession 
the defendant property was located in proximity to cocaine, 
methamphetamine and amphetamines. 
3. That pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §58-37-13 
(1994) , said defendant property was seized on or about the 21st day 
s, o^^ 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No, 9 5 0 9 O cJy> ^—^ CV 
Judge SANDRA PEULER 
of November, 1994, at 4811 South State Street, Salt Lake County, 
Utah by Officer Price of the Murray City Police Department incident 
to an arrest. 
4. That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, said 
defendant currency was unlawfully found in proximity to forfeitable 
controlled substances, drug manufacturing, or distributing 
paraphernalia or to forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances, was intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance, was 
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, or was used or intended to 
be used to facilitate a violation of this act and is presumed 
forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13, 
5. That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, said 
defendant vehicle was unlawfully used to transport or to facilitate 
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of a 
controlled substance in and is forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code, 
§58-37-13. 
6. That on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, the 
defendant cellular telephone, pager and dayplanner were equipment 
used or intended for use in manufacturing, compounding, processing, 
delivering, importing or exporting a controlled substance, and is 
forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code, §58-37-13 (1994). 
7. That the seizing agency, the Murray City Police 
Department is able to use the defendant property in the continued 
enforcement of controlled substance laws, and that pursuant to Utah 
Code §58-37-13 (1994) , plaintiff asks that the said property be 
awarded to the Murray City Police Department. 
8. That pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13 (1994), the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, as prosecuting agency, is entitled 
to the legal costs incurred in filing and pursuing said forfeiture 
action, to be paid by the seizing agency, the Murray City Police 
Department. 
9. That pursuant to Utah Code §58-37-13 (1994), plaintiff 
asks that all costs of this forfeiture proceeding, including filing 
fees, be paid by Frank Parker, the individual whose conduct is the 
basis of this forfeiture, 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as follows: 
1. That the previously described defendant property be 
ordered forfeited. 
2. That the seizing agency, the Murray City Police 
Department, is an appropriate agency able to use the defendant 
property in enforcement of controlled substance laws and that said 
property be awarded to said agency, 
3. That the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office be awarded 
the sum of $25.00 as attorney fees for filing and pursuing this 
action, to be paid by the seizing agency, the Murray City Police 
Department. 
4. That Frank Parker pay all costs of this forfeiture 
proceeding, including filing fees. 
DATED this 3 ) ^ ~ ~ day of March, 1995. 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
MIjZfHAEL^. POSTMA 
Deputy County Attorney 
^STRICT COURT COVER SHEE^ 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
(b) ATTORNEYS (name), 
Bar #, Address, 
Telephone # 
MICHAEL E. POSTMA, #6313 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-4156 
ATTORNEY (if known) 
II. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an x in appropriate category) 
DOMESTIC CIVIL 
DA Divorce/Annulment 
SM Separate Maintenance 
PA Paternity 
SA Spouse Abuse 
UR URESA Action 
PROBATE 
ES Estate 
GC Guardian/Conservator 
NC Name Change 
OT Other Probate 
ABSTRACTS 
AJ Abstract of Judgment 
TL Tax Lien 
AA Administrative Agency 
AP Appeal 
h CV Other Civil 
CN Contract 
CS Custody & Support 
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus 
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MI Miscellaneous 
MENTAL HEALTH 
MH Mental Health 
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EXHIBIT 2 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWER 
FRANK PARKER 
FOR HIMSELF 
Department of Corrections 
Draper, Utah 
.,.._ FILED ® 
Z'.U Li,, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, 
ONE LOT OF PROPERTY MORE 
FULLY DESCRIBED IN THE 
ATTACHED EXHIBIT A, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
A N S W E R 
CIVIL NO. 95090280/ 
JUDGE: PEULER 
COMES NOW FRANK PARKER and ANSWERS as follows: 
I. 
FRANK PARKER does not possess sufficient information to 
admit or deny the allegations found in paragraph one of the 
complaint. FRANK PARKER believes that the One Lot of Property 
More Fully Described in the Attached Exhibit A is the 
defendant in the forfeiture complaint. 
II. 
FRANK PARKER denies that the subject property was located 
in such proximity to cocaine, methamphetamine e,nd amphetamines, 
as to be the subject of a forfeiture action. 
III. 
FRANK PARKER does not possess sufficient information to 
know whether ar not the subject property was seized pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code 5S-37-13. FRANK PARKER admits that 
on or about the 21st day of November, 1994, at 4811 South State 
Street, the subject property was seized. 
IV. 
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph four. 
V. 
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph -five. 
VI. 
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph six. 
VII. 
FRANK PARKER denies the allegations found in paragraph 
seven, 
VIII. 
FRANK PARKER does not possess suffieient information to 
admit or deny the allegations found in paragraph eight. 
IX. 
FRANK PARKER denies the allegation found in paragraph nine. 
WHEREFORE FRANK PARKER prays for the following judgment: 
1. That the One Lot of Property More Fully Described in 
the Attached Exhibit A be returned to him, the owner of said 
property. 
2. That all costs and expenses of this forfeiture action 
be bourne by the complaining party (ties). 
3. Such other costs &nd awards that the Court may deem 
equitable and just. 
0 0 0 0 I v 
DATED THIS /£ DAY OF _ _ ^ J < ^ _ , 1 99^ 
FRANK PARKER 
VERIFICATION 
FRANK PARKER, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and says that he is the T^^\LP/\PtfJ£ttLthe above-entitled action; 
that he has read the foregoing ANSWER and understands the 
contents thereof, and the same is true of his own knowledge, 
information and belief. 
FRANK PARKER 
-do 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_/_<^_ day of 
.
<JQ2A<L » 1 9 9 5 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
I* COM*** Earn 
Drapf.Uth MOM 
NOTARY PUBLIC, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, FRANK PARKER certify that I mailed copies of this ANSWER 
to Douglas R. Short and Michael E. Postma at 2001 South State 
Street #S3400, Salt Lake City, Utah 34190-1200 this _j_J 
day of L.JLL~bL!\'-l. ,1995 
FRANK 
0 <» 0 0 1 3 
EXHIBIT 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
fiLEBDiSTRicrsa;:;, 
Third Judicial Distric-
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
OCT 1 7 1995 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE 
LOT OF PROPERTY MORE FULLY 
DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED 
EXHIBIT A, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 950902803 CV 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on Wednesday, September 13, 
1995, pursuant to the Notice of this Court. Judge Sandra N. Peuler, District Judge, presided. 
Plaintiff State of Utah was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. Claimant 
Frank Parker was present, pro se. The Court reviewed the file, and noted that Claimant filed a 
Motion to Return Seized Evidence herein on or about August 16, 1995, which was opposed by 
the State. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the respective memoranda which had been 
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. 
The Court called the matter for trial, and heard the testimony of the State's witnesses, and 
the respective legal arguments of Plaintiff s counsel and of Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker did not testify 
and presented no defense or other witnesses. The Court noted that Mr. Parker raised and 
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presented no testimony in defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, and yet Mr. Parker again stated 
that he was finished presenting his case. The Court, having heard and received the trial 
testimony and evidence, having reviewed the file, being fully advised and informed in the 
premises, for good cause shown, now makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Claimant Frank Parker's Motion to Return Seized Property was filed after the 
Trial of this matter was scheduled, and raised factual issues which made such Motion untimely 
and improper. Claimant's Motion should be denied. 
2. On November 21, 1994, Claimant was arrested, while on parole from the Utah 
State Prison, after he responded to a page from John Blanchard wherein Mr. Blanchard informed 
Claimant that he (Blanchard) wished to purchase cocaine from Claimant. 
3. On November 21, 1994 at approximately 11:50 p.m., Claimant was arrested at a 
7-11 convenience store located at 4811 South State Street, where he had arrived in the Defendant 
vehicle, to consumate a cocaine sale to Mr. Blanchard, and where he had arrived, driving the 
Defendant vehicle while in possession of an open container of alcohol in the driver's 
compartment of said vehicle, all of which were violations of law and of Claimant's parole. 
4. After securing Claimant and his vehicle, a search of the Defendant vehicle was 
conducted, incident to Claimant's arrest, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of Claimant's 
parole release from the Utah State Prison. At the time of Claimant's arrest, only he and his 
passenger had been in the Defendant vehicle. 
5. In the Defendant vehicle, a black pouch was found, which contained several small 
baggies, each of which contained a white, powdery substance. The State's witnesses testified, 
and the Court finds, that this type of packaging is consistent with the sale and distribution of 
cocaine. 
(\ a a a -'• <• 
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6. Claimant's passenger, Kimberlee Croft testified, and the Court finds, that the 
black pouch and baggies were the sole property and possessions of Claimant. 
7. At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was transporting, in his vehicle, several 
baggies which contained a white, powdery substance. The substance was tested by the Utah 
State Crime Lab, and found to be cocaine, with a total weight of 10.7 grams. 
8. At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was using and had used the Defendant vehicle 
pager and cellular telephone to facilitate the transportation and distribution of controlled 
substances, to wit: cocaine. 
9. At the time of Claimant's arrest, he was in the possession of the defendant 
currency, which was located in the proximity of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, and which 
is therefore presumed to be the illegal proceeds of the distribution , purchase or sale of controlled 
substances. 
10. Defendant currency was found in proximity to controlled substances, namely 
cocaine. Claimant produced no evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that 
the defendant currency is the proceeds of, or was intended to be used to facilitate, violations of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
11. Claimant produced no testimony or witnesses to contradict the State's witness 
evidence and testimony. 
12. Defendant currency is the proceeds of the illegal trafficking or distribution of 
controlled substances. 
13. The seizing agency, Murray City Police Department, is able to use the defendant 
currency, vehicle and property in its continued enforcement of controlled substance laws. 
14. Frank Parker is and was at all times the only registered owner and title holder in 
and to said Defendant vehicle. 
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FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Claimant's Motion for Return of Seized Evidence should be denied. 
2. Claimant received all posible notice of these proceedings, and of his own volition 
chose not to submit testimony or witnesses contradicting the State's evidence supporting 
judgment in this matter. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction over the defendant currency, vehicle and property and 
over the alleged interests therein of Claimant. 
3. Claimant Frank Parker is the individual in whose possession the defendant 
currency, vehicle and property were located in proximity to cocaine. 
4. On November 21, 1994, the defendant currency was unlawfully found in 
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, was intended to be furnished in exchange for a 
controlled substance and was proceeds traceable to an exchange for controlled substances, in 
violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et sgg. (1995), and 
is presumed forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(g)(ii) [1995]. No evidence 
has been presented by Claimant or on his behalf which overcomes this presumption. 
5. On November 21, 1994, the defendant vehicle was unlawfully used to transport a 
controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et seg. (1995), and is forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13(l)(e)[1995]. 
6. On November 21, 1994, the defendant cellular telephone and pager were 
unlawfully used or intended for use in delivering a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in 
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violation of the , Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1 et seg. (1995), and 
are forfeitable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(b) [1995]. 
7. The seizing agency, Murray City Police Department, is able to use defendant 
currency, vehicle and property in its continued enforcement of controlled substance laws. 
8. The Salt Lake County District Attorney's office is entitled to the legal costs and 
fees incurred in filing and pursuing this action, to be paid by the Murray City Police Department 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (8)(a). 
9. Plaintiff State of Utah has met its burden of proof in this matter with respect to 
each and all of the Defendant currency, vehicle and property, with the exception of the 
Claimant's electronic dayplanner. 
10. Judgment against the Defendant One Lot of Property, with the exception of the 
electronic dayplanner. and Claimant's purported interests therein, should be granted in favor of 
the State. The electronic dayplanner should be returned to Claimant. 
DATED this [ Q day of < Q C^H U L ^ . 1995. 
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Certificate of Service 
Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney, by his signature below, certifies to the Court 
that he delivered and served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law by depositing said copy in the United States mail, first class postage 
prepaid, on October , 1995, addressed as follows. 
Mr. Frank Parker 
Claimant Pro Se 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
1 
/ ; " " 
/< U 
/CLAkK A.4mRMS 
Deputy District Attorney 
j \clark\parker fnd 
EXHIBIT 4 
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
Third Judicial Distric? 
OCT 1 7 1995 
ET LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
94-13659 MURRAY CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER, ONE 
LOT OF PROPERTY MORE FULLY 
DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED 
EXHIBIT A, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE 
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JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on Wednesday, September 13, 
1995, pursuant to the Notice of this Court. Judge Sandra N. Peuler. District Judge, presided. 
Plaintiff State of Utah was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. Claimant 
Frank Parker was present, pro se. The Court reviewed the file, and noted that Claimant filed a 
Motion to Return Seized Evidence herein on or about August 16, 1995. which was opposed by 
the State. Previous to the hearing, the Court reviewed the respective memoranda which had been 
filed, and was in all respects familiar and conversant with the facts and issues of the case. 
The Court called the matter for trial, and heard the testimony of the State's witnesses, and 
the respective legal arguments of Plaintiff s counsel and of Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker did not testify 
/: (. r. 
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and presented no defense or other witnesses. The Court noted that Mr. Parker raised and 
presented no testimony in defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, and yet Mr. Parker again stated 
that he was finished presenting his case. The Court, having heard and received the trial 
testimony and evidence, having reviewed the file, being fully advised and informed in the 
premises, for good cause shown, having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now makes and enters the following Order and Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, THAT: 
1. Claimant Frank Parker's Motion to Return Seized Property is denied. 
2. Claimant Frank Parker is found to be without any legal interest in, or right or title 
to the Defendant currency, vehicle and property, and each and all of the Defendant currency, 
vehicle and property, to wit: ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN DOLLARS, UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY; One 1986 HONDA, VIN JHMAF5328GS019454; One NOKIA CELLULAR 
TELEPHONE, MODEL 100, SERIAL NO. 165/03533983; and One MOTOROLA DIGITAL 
PAGER, SERIAL NO. 007POS1788699, are adjudged forfeited in accordance with the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et sefl. (1995); and that said Defendant 
currency, vehicle and property shall be retained by the seizing agency, Murray City Police 
Department, according to the provisions of said Act. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(8)(a). (1995), the seizing agency, Murray 
City Police Department shall pay a reasonable attorney's fee to, and reimburse all costs incurred 
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by, the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office for its legal representation of the State of 
Utah's, and the seizing agency's, interests in this matter. 
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(k) (1953, as amended), Judgment is 
further entered against Frank Parker, whose conduct was the basis of this forfeiture, for all costs, 
including any filing fees, and storage fees, incurred in connection with these proceedings. 
DATED this \"\ day of C V ^ X o ^ v ^ , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Certificate of Service 
Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney, by his signature below, certifies to the Court 
that he delivered and served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment by 
depositing said copy in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on October D , 
1995, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Frank Parker 
Claimant Pro Se 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
j:\clark\parker.jdg 
CHARMS 
feputy District Attorney 
